A friendly computable characteristic function

Puduru V. Reddy and Georges Zaccour

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 82, issue C, 18-25

Abstract: We consider an n-player game in coalitional form. We use the so-called δ characteristic function to determine the strength of all possible coalitions. The value of a coalition is obtained under the behavioral assumption that left-out players do not react strategically to the formation of that coalition, but stick to their Nash equilibrium actions in the n-player noncooperative game. This assumption has huge computational merit, especially in games where each player is described by a large-scale mathematical program. For the class of games with multilateral externalities discussed in Chander and Tulkens, we show that the δ characteristic function is superadditive and has a nonempty core, and that the δ-core is a subset of the γ-core.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:18-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.008

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