Truncated Leximin solutions

Bram Driesen ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 83, issue C, 79-87

Abstract: This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable number of agents–Anonymity (AN), Individual Monotonicity (IM), and Consistency (CONS)–characterize a one-parameter family of Truncated Leximin solutions. Given a non-negative and possibly infinite α, an α-Truncated Leximin solution gives each agent the minimum of α and their Leximin solution payoff.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:83:y:2016:i:c:p:79-87

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.003

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