 Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamicsJia-Ping Huang, Maurice Koster and Ines Lindner (i.d.lindner@vu.nl) Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 84, issue C, 109-118 Abstract: In this paper we propose a generalized model of network games to incorporate preferences as an endogenous driving force of innovation. Individuals can choose between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or stay with the default one. A key element is an individual threshold, i.e. the number or proportion of others who must take action before a given actor does so. This threshold represents an individual’s inclination to adopt the new behavior. The main novelty of the paper is to assume that the thresholds are endogenously determined. Agents change their inclination by exposition to other inclinations in the social network. This provides a coupled dynamical system of aggregate adoption rate and inclinations orchestrated by the network. With our model we are able to explain a variety of adoption behavior. Of particular interest is the existence of non-monotonic behavior of the aggregate adoption rate which is not possible in the benchmark model without inclination. Our model is therefore able to explain “sudden” outbreaks of collective action. This suggests to reinvent the common static and exogenous concept of a tipping point by defining it endogenously generated by the network. Date: 2016 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:84:y:2016:i:c:p:109-118 DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.10.007 Access Statistics for this article Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to econpapers@oru.se.
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.