Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, paternalism and optimal mixed taxation

Thomas Aronsson and Tomas Sjögren

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol. 84, issue C, 24-36

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic model with endogenous labor supply, savings and health capital, where the consumers differ in ability as well as suffer from a self-control problem generated by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The purpose is to analyze how a paternalistic government, which implements a time-consistent mix of labor income taxation, capital income taxation and commodity taxation, ought to use this tax system for purposes of redistribution and correction when individual ability is private information. Among the results, we show how the (nonlinear) income taxes ought to be used as indirect instruments for influencing the commodity demand behavior at the individual level: the intuition is that linear commodity taxes are not flexible enough to achieve proper incentives for consumption of unhealthy goods.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:84:y:2016:i:c:p:24-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.002

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