Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?

Fabien Ngendakuriyo () and Georges Zaccour

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 85, issue C, 30-36

Abstract: We consider a dynamic game with a corrupt government and multiple civil society organizations as the players. We characterize feedback Stackelberg equilibria with the government as leader and two civil society organizations as the followers who can compete or cooperate when deciding their monitoring efforts. Overall, the numerical results show that a cooperation yields a higher institutional quality and output than does the competitive regime as it does for both individuals and government payoff while the players invest less efforts. In a nutshell, we found that it is in the best interest of both the government and civil society organizations that the latter coordinate their actions and efforts and cooperate in fight against corruption.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:85:y:2017:i:c:p:30-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.001

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