Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour
Hans Gersbach ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 85, issue C, 37-43
“Flexible Majority Rules” are rules for which the majority threshold depends on the proposal on the table. We present the core ideas of Flexible Majority Rules with a new model and survey the current state of affairs of such rules. We show that the proposal-dependency of Flexible Majority Rules can take many forms and it allows many applications. Finally, we outline new research areas and applications for Flexible Majority Rules.
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