Flexible Majority Rules in democracyville: A guided tour

Hans Gersbach

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 85, issue C, 37-43

Abstract: “Flexible Majority Rules” are rules for which the majority threshold depends on the proposal on the table. We present the core ideas of Flexible Majority Rules with a new model and survey the current state of affairs of such rules. We show that the proposal-dependency of Flexible Majority Rules can take many forms and it allows many applications. Finally, we outline new research areas and applications for Flexible Majority Rules.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:85:y:2017:i:c:p:37-43

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.010

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