Spanning tree auctions: A complete characterization

Abdul Quadir

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 86, issue C, 1-8

Abstract: We consider a mechanism design problem over a connected graph in private value environment where the type of an agent is a single number. The preference over transfers is quasi-linear for every agent. We give a complete characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms for this problem. Further, by imposing a suitable version of anonymity and non-bossiness along with dominant strategy incentive compatibility, we find that the only mechanisms satisfying all these conditions are the Groves mechanisms.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489616301950
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:86:y:2017:i:c:p:1-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.001

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().