Spanning tree auctions: A complete characterization
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 86, issue C, 1-8
We consider a mechanism design problem over a connected graph in private value environment where the type of an agent is a single number. The preference over transfers is quasi-linear for every agent. We give a complete characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms for this problem. Further, by imposing a suitable version of anonymity and non-bossiness along with dominant strategy incentive compatibility, we find that the only mechanisms satisfying all these conditions are the Groves mechanisms.
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