Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure

Sébastien Courtin, Zéphirin Nganmeni and Bertrand Tchantcho

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 86, issue C, 9-17

Abstract: This work focuses on the evaluation of voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure. Dichotomous multi-type games, introduced by Courtin et al. (2016), model games in which there is a number of non-ordered types of support in the input, while the output is dichotomous, i.e. the proposal is either accepted or rejected. In a game with a coalition structure, it is supposed that players organize themselves into disjoint coalitions which are defined a priori. We extend the well-known Owen index and Banzhaf–Owen index to this class of games. A full characterization of these power indices is provided.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489616302141
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:86:y:2017:i:c:p:9-17

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().