Divide and compromise
Antonio Nicolo' () and
Rodrigo A. Velez
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 100-110
We introduce two symmetrized versions of the popular divide-and-choose mechanism for the allocation of a collectively owned indivisible good between two agents when monetary compensation is available. Our proposals retain the simplicity of divide-and-choose and correct its ex-post asymmetry. When there is complete information, i.e., agents know each other well, both mechanisms implement in subgame perfect equilibria a unique allocation that would be obtained by a balanced market. The results hold for general continuous preferences that may not be quasi-linear.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Divide and compromise (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:100-110
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier
More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().