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Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems

Shyam Chandramouli and Jay Sethuraman

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 111-118

Abstract: Motivated by applications in many economic environments, Bochet et al. (2010) generalize the classic rationing model (Sprumont 1991) as follows: there is a moneyless market, in which a non-storable, homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so. For this problem they propose the egalitarian transfer solution, which equalizes the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. Furthermore, they show that the egalitarian mechanism elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links. In the variant where demanders are not strategic but demands need to be exactly met Bochet et al. (2013), they propose a similar mechanism for which truthfully reporting the peaks is a dominant strategy, but truthful reporting of links is not.

Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:111-118