A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
Natalia M. Novikova and
Irina I. Pospelova
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 141-144
The paper is devoted to the investigation of intuitively rational choice in a hierarchical game that is a model of election by open sequential veto-voting. Casting a veto against voter’s least preferred alternative (among remaining ones) may not lead to a sophisticated equilibrium. It means that sincere choice (being intuitive) is not rational. There arises the problem of finding conditions under which a sophisticated optimal sequence of actions is intuitively rational. We prove that in the case of strict preference ordering of alternatives, there exists an intuitively rational sophisticated optimal sequence. In the sequence, each voter vetoes an alternative less preferred than the sophisticated equilibrium outcome. Thus, only intuitively rational strategies are to be considered, although complete information about voters’ preferences is still needed.
Keywords: Hierarchical games; Sequential voting by veto; Order of voting; Sophisticated equilibrium; Rational choice; Intuitive rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:141-144
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier
More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().