Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

Hervé Crès and Utku Unver

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 145-149

Abstract: Consider a two-dimensional spatial voting model. A finite number m of voters are randomly drawn from a (weakly) symmetric distribution centered at O. We compute the exact probabilities of all possible Simpson–Kramer scores of O. The computations are independent of the shape of the distribution. The resulting expected score of O is an upper bound of the expected min–max score.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:145-149

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.006

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