Consistent bilateral assignment
Herve Moulin ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 43-55
In the bilateral assignment problem, source a holds the amount ra of resource of type a, while sink i must receive the total amount xi of the various resources. We look for assignment rules meeting the powerful separability property known as Consistency: “every subassignment of a fair assignment is fair”. They are essentially those rules selecting the feasible flow minimizing the sum ∑i,aW(yia), where W is smooth and strictly convex.
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