Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers

Suchan Chae and Jaehee Song

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, issue C, 63-72

Abstract: We study price competition between heterogeneous matchmakers in a two-sided matching market. It is well known that when two passive matchmakers who provide random matching services compete with entrance fees, there exists no pure-strategy equilibrium. We show that when a passive matchmaker and an active matchmaker, who provides an assortive matching service, compete with entrance fees, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium. We also provide welfare comparison between the duopoly and a monopoly operating both the passive and active networks.

Keywords: Random matching; Assortive matching; Matchmakers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489617300987
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:63-72

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.06.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().