Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games
Flavio Delbono and
Luca Lambertini ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 92, issue C, 10-15
We study a class of games featuring payoff functions where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the infinite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on infinite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:92:y:2018:i:c:p:10-15
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier
More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().