Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted

Kyohei Marutani

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 93, issue C, 153-158

Abstract: We consider school choice problems where students may submit only restricted length of preference lists. We propose an acyclicity condition for the priority structure of schools. When schools’ priorities are substitutable, we show that a Pareto efficient and stable assignment rule is Nash implementable by the deferred acceptance mechanism if and only if schools’ priority structures are acyclic in our sense.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:153-158

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.007

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