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Partially cooperative games

Tomohiko Kawamori

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 93, issue C, 90-100

Abstract: In this paper, we present a general model in which mutually dependent negotiations are simultaneously conducted and define a solution concept for the model. We provide a sufficient condition for the solution to exist and show that the solutions approximately coincide with the equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games. We present a solution to the merger paradox as an application.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:90-100

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.001

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