Incomplete decision-making and Arrow’s impossibility theorem

Sususmu Cato ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 94, issue C, 58-64

Abstract: This paper is concerned with social choice without completeness of social preference. Completeness requires that pairs of alternatives are perfectly comparable. We introduce the concept of minimal comparability, which requires that for any profile, there is some comparable pair of distinct alternatives. Complete silence should be avoided according to this condition. We show that there exists no normatively desirable aggregation rule satisfying minimal comparability.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:94:y:2018:i:c:p:58-64

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.002

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