Non-deterministic group contest with private information
Jean-François Mercier ()
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 95, issue C, 47-53
I study a non-deterministic group contest à la Tullock in which contestants are privately informed about their valuation for winning the contest. A group of two and a single contestant compete against each other to win the contest. I analyze contestants’ incentive to free-ride in the large group and I offer a sufficient condition for all contestants to exert strictly positive expected effort in equilibrium. Lastly, I apply this model to verify the validity of Olson’s paradox, which asserts that large groups are less effective than small groups at winning a contest.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:95:y:2018:i:c:p:47-53
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