Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability
Wolfgang Leininger and
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 96, issue C, 1-9
It is a widely known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finite number of firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). In this paper, we provide an alternative analysis of an asymmetric oligopoly market, which does not lead to marginal cost pricing and the competitive outcome in the long-run.
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