Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 96, issue C, 85-91
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels, we present results on the existence of equilibrium and total rent dissipation.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:96:y:2018:i:c:p:85-91
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