Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences

Norihisa Sato

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 97, issue C, 51-60

Abstract: We explore the possibility of axiomatic characterization of approval voting when the set of voters is fixed and each voter has a dichotomous preference over the alternatives. We first prove that if the set of alternatives is variable, a social choice rule is approval voting if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness together with four standard axioms. We then establish a similar characterization in the case of fixed alternatives by introducing a stronger version of strategy-proofness. The latter result answers an open problem left in M. Vorsatz (2007).

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:97:y:2019:i:c:p:51-60

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.10.001

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