Proportional representation with uncertainty

Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Elena Manzoni and Carlos Pimienta ()

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 99, issue C, 18-23

Abstract: We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about the voter’s preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most of the voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Proportional Representation with Uncertainty (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:99:y:2019:i:c:p:18-23

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.004

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