 How do entrenched managers handle stakeholders interests?Huimin Chung, Jane Raung Lin and Ying Sui Yang Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 2012, vol. 22, issue 5, 263-277 Abstract: This study examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on non-shareholding stakeholders. We find that managers tend to focus different levels of attention on specific non-shareholding stakeholders relative to their level of entrenchment. When managers have greater protection, they tend to establish good relationships with certain stakeholders, particularly with regard to the natural environment. However, well-protected managers attempt to minimize any damage to workforce diversity and often increase the damage to the employees and the natural environment. Entrenched managers pay more attention to stakeholders who can have a positive influence on the short-term financial performance of the firm. However, negative social actions have insignificant effect on financial performance. Keywords: Managerial entrenchment; Corporate social responsibility; Anti-takeover provisions; Environmental stakeholder; Financial performance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mulfin:v:22:y:2012:i:5:p:263-277 DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2012.10.002 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Multinational Financial Management is currently edited by I. Mathur and G. G. Booth More articles in Journal of Multinational Financial Management from Elsevier |
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