Does investor protection regime affect the effectiveness of outside directorship on the board?

Jagdish Pathak and Jerry Sun

Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 2013, vol. 23, issue 1, 19-33

Abstract: Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance. The purpose of this study is to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management. Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside directorship on the board is associated with lower earnings management in the international context. We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of board outside directorship in constraining earnings management between high and low investor protection countries. Our findings mitigate a concern that harmonized corporate governance in low investor protection countries may not work.

Keywords: Investor protection; Corporate governance; Outside directorship; Internationalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 K2 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mulfin:v:23:y:2013:i:1:p:19-33

DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2012.10.004

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