Does cross-listing in the US foster mergers and acquisitions and increase target shareholder wealth?

Jean-Claude Cosset and Siham Meknassi

Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 2013, vol. 23, issue 1, 54-73

Abstract: We examine the role of cross-listing in alleviating domestic market constraints and facilitating mergers and acquisitions. Our results show that cross-listing allows shareholders of target firms to extract higher takeover premiums relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Moreover, shareholders of Sarbanes–Oxley-compliant targets seem to benefit from a higher premium. We also find that cross-listed firms are more likely to be acquisition targets, consistent with the belief that cross-listing increases firms’ attractiveness and visibility on the market for corporate control. Our results are robust to various specifications and to the self-selection bias arising from the decision to cross-list.

Keywords: Cross-listing; Mergers and acquisitions; Governance; Sarbanes–Oxley Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G34 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mulfin:v:23:y:2013:i:1:p:54-73

DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2012.11.001

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