A note on the optimal pricing strategy in the discrete-time Geo/Geo/1 queuing system with sojourn time-dependent reward

Doo Ho Lee

Operations Research Perspectives, 2017, vol. 4, issue C, 113-117

Abstract: This work studies the optimal pricing strategy in a discrete-time Geo/Geo/1 queuing system under the sojourn time-dependent reward. We consider two types of pricing schemes. The first one is called the ex-post payment scheme where the server charges a price that is proportional to the time a customer spends in the system, and the second one is called ex-ante payment scheme where the server charges a flat price for all services. In each pricing scheme, a departing customer receives the reward that is inversely proportional to his/her sojourn time. The server should make the optimal pricing decisions in order to maximize its expected profits per time unit in each pricing scheme. This work also investigates customer's equilibrium joining or balking behavior under server's optimal pricing strategy. Numerical experiments are also conducted to validate our analysis.

Keywords: Optimal pricing; Equilibrium behavior; Geo/Geo/1 queue; Sojourn time-dependent reward (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:oprepe:v:4:y:2017:i:c:p:113-117

DOI: 10.1016/j.orp.2017.08.001

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