Appointments of outsiders as CEOs, state-owned enterprises, and firm performance: Evidence from China
Fuxiu Jiang,
Jicheng Huang and
Kenneth Kim
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2013, vol. 23, issue C, 49-64
Abstract:
We study CEO successions in China and focus on the decision to appoint outsiders as CEOs. In doing so, we also differentiate our sample into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and non-SOEs. We find that firm-specific factors can predict external successions for SOEs, but not for non-SOEs. Further, for those SOEs that choose outsiders as CEOs for firm-specific reasons, their subsequent firm performance improves.
Keywords: CEO succession; State-owned enterprise; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:23:y:2013:i:c:p:49-64
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.01.003
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