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Delisting pressure, executive compensation, and corporate fraud: Evidence from China

Fangzhao Zhou, Zenan Zhang, Jun Yang, Yunpeng Su and Yunbi An

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2018, vol. 48, issue C, 17-34

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and the incidence of corporate fraud in Chinese listed companies from the perspective of delisting pressure. We find that delisting pressure directly contributes to the incidence of fraud, especially the incidence of information disclosure violations, given the unique listing and delisting systems in the Chinese stock market. We also find that CEOs and CFOs with relatively low pay are more likely to commit fraud, regardless of whether or not delisting pressure is present. However, delisting pressure weakens the negative relationship between executive pay and the likelihood of corporate fraud. Finally, when equity incentives are also considered, the effect of CEOs' total compensation on fraud is contingent on delisting pressure. High CEOs' total compensation has a deterring effect on fraud for firms with no delisting pressure, while this effect disappears for firms with delisting pressure.

Keywords: Delisting pressure; Corporate fraud; Executive compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:48:y:2018:i:c:p:17-34

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