Compensation structure of family business groups

Hohyun Kim and Seung Hun Han

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2018, vol. 51, issue C, 376-391

Abstract: We examine executive compensation structures with a focus on family business groups in Korea. Our results show that Korean family business groups provide 60% more total compensation to CEOs who are family members than to professional CEOs. This excessive increment is not based on performance-contingent payments, but on fixed payments. Our propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses robustly support these results. Further, we find that operation of internal capital markets, CEO talents, CEO stock ownership, and family board membership do not explain the excessive compensation of family CEOs in family business groups. The evidence indicates rent extraction through executive compensation in family business groups.

Keywords: CEO compensation; Family business group; Family CEO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:376-391

DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2018.09.002

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