Managerial rents vs. shareholder value in closed-end funds: Evidence from China

Jacquelyn E. Humphrey, David Hunter, Khoa Hoang and Wang Chun Wei

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2020, vol. 64, issue C

Abstract: We examine Chinese closed-end funds (CEFs) to determine if poorly performing (outperforming) managers experience a reduction (increase) in assets under management. In other words, we test if there is market-imposed discipline or if managers are able to extract rents from investors by their being a disconnect between performance and assets under management. Our paper is a replication of Wu et al. (2016) who examine the phenomenon in the US market. We find little evidence of market discipline in the Chinese CEF market.

Keywords: Closed-endfunds; China; Replication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:64:y:2020:i:c:s0927538x2030665x

DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101453

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