Pay of political directors in China

Xiaoming Wang and Tingting Xu

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2022, vol. 74, issue C

Abstract: Independent directors of firms benefit from prior political connections acquired during the public service. Such so-called “politician directors” are found to receive excessive directorship fee. In a quasi-natural experiment, the anti-corruption campaign of “Eight-Point Policy” significantly reduces excessive directorship fee of politician directors. We rule out monitoring or advising role that might otherwise explain excessive directorship fee of politician directors. Finally, weak firms with low productivity or poor performance tend to hire politician officials mainly for accessing bank financing. The evidence highlights the dark side of politician directors and suggests resource misallocation of credit allocation due to political connections.

Keywords: Pay; Political connections; Performance; Director; China; Cronyism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 H11 J24 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X22000981
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:74:y:2022:i:c:s0927538x22000981

DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2022.101803

Access Statistics for this article

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is currently edited by K. Chan and S. Ghon Rhee

More articles in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().