Board diversity and the marginal value of corporate cash holdings
Hanping Yang and
Kunkun Xue
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2023, vol. 79, issue C
Abstract:
Using the Blau index, this study measures board diversity and uses data on A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2011 and 2020 to investigate how board diversity affects the marginal value of corporate cash holdings. We find that greater board diversity indicates a greater marginal value of corporate cash holdings. Board independence, property rights, and environmental dynamism moderate the relationship between board diversity and the marginal value of corporate cash holdings. Further mechanism analysis shows that high-diversity boards improve the marginal value of corporate cash holdings by alleviating agency problems and increasing firms' resources. This study provides new ideas and evidence for discussing how macro- and micro-factors affect corporate governance. Furthermore, the results provide a reference for accounting information users to analyze corporate value and make reasonable investment decisions.
Keywords: Board diversity; Marginal value; Corporate cash holdings; Board independence; Property rights; Environmental dynamism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:79:y:2023:i:c:s0927538x23001142
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.102048
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