 Negative information hoarding in politically connected firms: The influence from the central environmental protection inspectionsShuai Yue, Hamish D. Anderson and Jing Liao Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2024, vol. 88, issue C Abstract: This study examines how managerial political connections affect corporate information environment in the context of central government environmental inspections. We find that politically connected firms are associated with higher crash risk than firms without such connections after central government inspections. In addition, we find that firms are more prone to crash risk when they are with achieved political connections (e.g. appointed as members of political advisory bodies), but not ascribed political connections (i.e. have work experience as government officials). Further analyses indicate that politically connected firms are more prone to crash risk after central government inspections due to increased reputational concerns. Overall, our study highlights that politically connected firms may face more challenges in managing negative information when there is intensified regulatory scrutiny, which exacerbates the risk profile of firms. Keywords: Political connections; Stock price crash risk; Environmental inspections; Campaign-style enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:88:y:2024:i:c:s0927538x24003238 DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102571 Access Statistics for this article Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is currently edited by K. Chan and S. Ghon Rhee More articles in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.