EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Administrative monopoly regulation and the cost of debt financing: Evidence from China

Shuxun Cai and Xiaoran Ni

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2025, vol. 92, issue C

Abstract: Traditional antitrust research has primarily focused on the market-based monopoly, while less attention given to those formed by administrative power. This study explores how the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) in China, designed to curb administrative monopoly, influences corporate debt financing costs. We find that administrative monopoly regulation reduces the cost of debt financing. Enhanced accounting information quality and lower corporate default risk are two possible channels. The main effect is more pronounced among private firms, small-sized and medium-sized firms, and firms in regions with lower degree of financial marketization. The FCRS also aids in addressing the issue of “zombie firms”, mitigating their crowding-out effect on the debt financing of normal firms. Moreover, the cost of debt financing decreases more when the review measures include both stringent self-inspection and external supervision. These findings underscore the importance of administrative monopoly regulation and contribute to the advancement of antitrust endeavors in the Asia-Pacific region.

Keywords: Administrative monopoly regulation; Debt financing cost; Accounting information quality; Corporate default risk; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X25001143
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:92:y:2025:i:c:s0927538x25001143

DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2025.102777

Access Statistics for this article

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is currently edited by K. Chan and S. Ghon Rhee

More articles in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-06-17
Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:92:y:2025:i:c:s0927538x25001143