European Journal of Political Economy

1985 - 2025

Current editor(s): J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

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Volume 14, issue 4, 1998

Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests pp. 575-585

Mark Gradstein

Designing an optimal contest pp. 587-603

Ani Dasgupta and Kofi O. Nti

Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes pp. 605-625

Derek J. Clark and Christian Riis

The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information pp. 627-644

Yasar Barut and Dan Kovenock

Asymmetric information contests pp. 645-665

Terrance Hurley and Jason Shogren

Complementarity in contests pp. 667-684

Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos

Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests pp. 685-701

Kyung Baik

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good pp. 703-725

Bouwe Dijkstra

Collective contests with externalities pp. 727-738

Sanghack Lee and J. Hyeong Kang

Collective rent seeking and division of labor1 pp. 739-768

Kjell Hausken

Effort and performance in group contests pp. 769-781

Kofi O. Nti

An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking pp. 783-800

Jan Potters, Casper de Vries and Frans van Winden

Volume 14, issue 3, 1998

The two concepts of money: implications for the analysis of optimal currency areas pp. 407-432

Charles A. E. Goodhart

How high can inflation get during hyperinflation? A transaction cost demand for money approach pp. 433-451

Jesús Vázquez

Growth, lobbying and public goods pp. 453-473

Hamid Mohtadi and Terry Roe

Why everybody loves Flipper: the political-economy of the U.S. dolphin-safe laws pp. 475-509

Achim Korber

An open shop trade union model of wages, effort and membership pp. 511-527

David R. Moreton

Source-based versus residence-based capital income taxes in a dynamic model pp. 529-541

Arjan Lejour and Harrie A. A. Verbon

The political economy of capital controls and tax policy in a small open economy pp. 543-559

Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup

The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock pp. 561-572

Robert Dur and Otto Swank

Volume 14, issue 2, 1998

Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered pp. 189-207

Joel M. Guttman

Agreement and efficiency: response to Guttman pp. 209-213

James Buchanan

Reply to Guttman pp. 215-218

Gordon Tullock

The external costs of voting rules: a note on Guttman, Buchanan, and Tullock pp. 219-222

Kenneth Arrow

Towards an economic theory of party ideology pp. 223-240

Otto Swank

Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability pp. 241-263

Bernd Hayo

Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation pp. 265-279

Oliver Lorz

A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy pp. 281-301

Bouwe Dijkstra

Endogenous education policy and increasing income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers pp. 303-326

Alessandro Turrini

Growth through taxes or borrowing? A model of development traps with public capital pp. 327-344

Roberto Burguet and Jorge Fernández-Ruiz

Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competition of local firms pp. 345-368

Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann

On measuring inequity in taxation: a new approach pp. 369-380

Nanak Kakwani and Peter J. Lambert

Does centralised bargaining reduce individual effort? pp. 381-406

Giorgio Brunello

Volume 14, issue 1, 1998

Communication skills and competition for donors pp. 3-18

Hans Gersbach

Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and income redistribution pp. 19-33

Giorgio Bellettini

Policy volatility and economic growth: A comparative, empirical analysis pp. 35-52

Aymo Brunetti

The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources pp. 53-71

James Forder

Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis pp. 73-88

Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling and Marco Hoeberichts

Quantal response models in step-level public good games pp. 89-100

Theo Offerman, Arthur Schram and Joep Sonnemans

Equilibrium assignments in pairwise team contests: How to form political slates and tennis teams pp. 101-114

Jonathan Hamilton and Richard Romano

The political economy of retaliation, liberalization and trade wars pp. 115-137

David Gould and Graeme L. Woodbridge

Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits pp. 139-165

Till Requate

Price leadership and asymmetric price rigidity pp. 167-187

Dan Kovenock and Kealoha Widdows

Volume 13, issue 4, 1997

Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The distribution of seigniorage wealth in EMU1 pp. 665-689

Hans-Werner Sinn and Holger Feist

Voting requirements, concessions, international side payments and the European Monetary Union pp. 691-703

Raimund Krumm and Bernhard Herz

Voting on social security: Evidence from OECD countries pp. 705-724

Friedrich Breyer and Ben Craig

Depreciation and intergenerational altruism in the private provision of public goods pp. 725-738

Gareth Myles

Political and economic determinants of OECD budget deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation pp. 739-750

Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egbert Sturm

Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered pp. 751-764

Erich Weede

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities pp. 765-781

Bruno De Borger

Shaping long-run expectations in problems of coordination pp. 783-806

Fernando Vega-Redondo

How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis pp. 807-821

Helge Berger and Ulrich Woitek

Reply to Berger and Woitek pp. 823-827

Roland Vaubel

Volume 13, issue 3, 1997

Editorial introduction pp. 393-393

Arye Hillman

Reforming government: An overview of recent experience pp. 395-417

Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht

Property rights, contracts, cyclical social preferences and the Coase theorem: A synthesis pp. 419-442

Peter Bernholz

Compound majority paradoxes and proportional representation pp. 443-454

Hannu Nurmi

Exit, voice and income taxes: The loyalty of voters pp. 455-478

Lars Feld

Politicians' preferences on local tax rates: An empirical analysis pp. 479-502

John Ashworth and Bruno Heyndels

A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles pp. 503-516

Gernot Sieg

Conscientious regulation and post-regulatory employment restrictions pp. 517-536

Elise Brezis and Avi Weiss

Voting for a coalition government: A game-theoretic view pp. 537-555

Stefano Vannucci

Indirect voting systems: Banzhaf numbers, majority functions and collective competence pp. 557-573

Sven Berg

Decoy alternatives in policy choices: Asymmetric domination and compromise effects pp. 575-589

Kaisa Herne

Dutch disease and rent seeking: The Greenland model pp. 591-614

Martin Paldam

Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare pp. 615-637

Johan Lagerlof

Uncertainty and systematic bias in provision of social benefits by a public bureaucracy pp. 639-659

Theis Theisen

Volume 13, issue 2, 1997

The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence pp. 201-224

Roland Vaubel

Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers pp. 225-246

Susanne Lohmann

Convergence of the EU Member States towards the EMU requirements, 1986 to 1993 pp. 247-259

Peter Guldager

Dynamic incentives and term limits in bureaucracy regulation pp. 261-279

Kai Konrad and Gaute Torsvik

Delegation in contests pp. 281-298

Kyung Baik and In-Gyu Kim

Political economic determinants of school spending in federal states: Theory and time-series evidence pp. 299-314

Torberg Falch and Jorn Rattso

Inequality aversion, macroeconomic objectives and the marginal welfare cost of indirect taxation Does flexibility of prices and wages matter? pp. 315-341

Dirk Van de gaer, Erik Schokkaert and Guido De Bruyne

Income tax credits and exemptions pp. 343-351

Peter J. Lambert and Shlomo Yitzhaki

Wage bargaining with incomplete information in an unionized Cournot oligopoly pp. 353-374

Vincent Vannetelbosch

Bargaining over effort pp. 375-384

George Bulkley and Gareth Myles

"The monetary dynamics in the Yugoslav hyperinflation of 1991-1993: The Cagan money demand" [European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996) 467-483] pp. 385-387

Pavle Petrovic and Zorica Vujosevic

Volume 13, issue 1, 1997

Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior pp. 1-31

Jan Potters, Randolph Sloof and Frans van Winden

Growth and the public sector: A critical review essay pp. 33-52

Jonas Agell, Thomas Lindh and Henry Ohlsson

Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world pp. 53-79

Roel Beetsma and Lans Bovenberg

The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986-1992 pp. 81-99

Peter Nannestad and Martin Paldam

Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes pp. 121-130

Kyung Baik and Sanghack Lee

Price controls and electoral cycles pp. 131-142

Pierre-Richard Agénor and Carlos Asilis

Election outcomes and the stockmarket: Further results pp. 143-155

Wen-ya Chang and Ching-chong Lai

Education policy in a non-altruistic model of intergenerational transfers with endogenous fertility pp. 157-169

Alessandro Balestrino

The power distribution in decision making among EU member states pp. 171-185

Ulrich Bindseil and Cordula Hantke

Comment on Gros and Gonciarz pp. 187-188

Richard Baldwin

Comment on Gros and Gonciarz pp. 189-193

Mitchell Kellman

Rejoinder pp. 195-196

Daniel Gros and Andrzej Gonciarz

Preferences, Institutions, and Rational Choice: Keith Dowding and Desmond King, eds., Institutions, and Rational Choice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) pp. 197-200

Johannes Schmidt