The conservative central banker revisited: Too conservative is more costly than too liberal

Peter Tillmann

European Journal of Political Economy, 2008, vol. 24, issue 4, 737-741

Abstract: A conservative central banker, who puts more weight on inflation stabilization than the social planner, solves the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy. This note shows that the welfare costs of deviating from the optimal degree of monetary conservatism are asymmetric. A too conservative central banker is more costly than a too liberal central banker.

Keywords: Optimal; monetary; policy; Delegation; Conservative; central; bank; Stabilization; bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(08)00076-1
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:737-741

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().