Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers
European Journal of Political Economy, 2010, vol. 26, issue 1, 89-103
This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. The strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, depending on the share of evaders in the society. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative as their evasion depends on the others' compliance. We characterize the equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the implications for tax and enforcement policies. The analysis is extended to the case of a society consisting of heterogenous communities. Individual evasion decisions are then embedded in a complex social structure and behavior is influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we highlight the role of belief management as an alternative policy tool.
Keywords: Tax; evasion; Social; norms; Multiple; equilibria; Conditional; cooperation; Belief; management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:89-103
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