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Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?

Amedeo Piolatto

European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 27, issue 2, 311-327

Abstract: This study compares the representativeness of voters in the proportional electoral system with the situation under plurality rule. Representativeness is commonly measured by comparing parties' received votes with their shares of seats in the Parliament, this implies that proportional rule should always represent voters better. A coalition within the Parliament, however, rules the country without interference. When a coalition is formed, the pivotal role of small parties and the proposal right of the formateur may significantly impact the distribution of power. Focusing on the coalition formation stage, I demonstrate that proportional rule is more representative only under specific conditions. Otherwise, introducing certain distortions in the distribution of seats among parties can actually improve representativeness.

Keywords: Electoral; systems; Proportional; rule; Plurality; rule; Voters'; representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters? (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences (2009) Downloads
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