Does corruption discourage international trade?

Eelke de Jong and Christian Bogmans ()

European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 27, issue 2, 385-398

Abstract: We use measures of trade-related corruption to investigate the effects of corruption on international trade and compare the results with those of corruption in general. We distinguish corruption in an exporting economy from that in an importing economy. Both distinctions appear to be important. Corruption in general hampers international trade, whereas bribe paying to customs enhances imports. This effect is most robust in importing countries with inefficient customs. High waiting times at the border significantly reduce international trade. The effects of unpredictability of corruption and policies are inconclusive.

Keywords: Corruption; International; trade; Quality; of; customs; Gravity; equation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (65)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:2:p:385-398

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