On the ‘cashing out’ hypothesis and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies

Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks

European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 27, issue 4, 601-610

Abstract: In the literature on paternalism that has grown out of the behavioural economics ‘revolution’, a distinction is drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policies. Although this hard/soft distinction seems to be motivated by the thought that the two policy types might have different implications for individual liberty, there is a claim that ‘hard’ policies are normatively superior to ‘soft’ for ‘efficiency’ reasons. We show, by appeal to an esteem-based model of ‘soft’ policy that this claim is not valid in general. We also expose a number of conceptual mistakes in what many seem to have identified as the normative implications of behavioural economics.

Keywords: ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ paternalism; Social esteem; Israeli kindergarten puzzle; Emotional tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D6 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:601-610

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.06.001

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