Government directors and business–state relations in Russia

Timothy Frye and Ichiro Iwasaki

European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 27, issue 4, 642-658

Abstract: We propose three ideal types of business–state relations in a transition economy and explore the impact of government directors on corporate boards for firm behavior. Using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies in Russia, we find that the presence of government directors on corporate boards is more consistent with a “collusion” ideal type of relations between firms and the state than with a managerial discipline or rent-extraction ideal type. The state sends directors to firms that both extract resources from the state, but that also provide important benefits and services to the state.

Keywords: Politically connected firm; Government directorship; Business–state relationship; Corporate governance quality; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 H32 L33 P26 P31 P35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:642-658

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.06.003

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