Labor courts, nomination bias, and unemployment in Germany

Helge Berger () and Michael Neugart

European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, vol. 27, issue 4, 659-673

Abstract: Labor courts play an important role in determining the effective level of labor market regulation in Germany, but their application of law may not be even-handed. Based on a theoretical model of the legal process and a new panel data set, we identify a nomination bias in labor court activity — that is, court activity varies systematically with the political leaning of the government that has appointed judges. In an extension, we find a significant positive relation between labor court activity and unemployment, even after controlling for the endogeneity of court activity.

Keywords: Courts; Labor courts; Law production; Nomination bias; Unemployment; Regulation; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J53 K31 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Labor courts, nomination bias and unemployment in Germany (2011)
Working Paper: Labor Courts, Nomination Bias, and Unemployment in Germany (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:659-673

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.05.006

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