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Political institutions, voter turnout, and policy outcomes

Eileen Fumagalli and Gaia Narciso

European Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 28, issue 2, 162-173

Abstract: This paper tests whether constitutions directly affect economic outcomes. By introducing citizens' political participation as the driving force connecting institutions to policy outcomes, we empirically show that voter turnout is the channel through which forms of government affect economic policies. We provide evidence of the existence of two relationships. First, presidential regimes appear to be associated with lower voter participation in national elections. Second, higher voter participation induces an increase in government expenditure, total revenues, welfare state spending, and budget deficit. We conclude that forms of government affect policy outcomes only through voter turnout.

Keywords: Electoral rule; Form of government; Voter participation; Policy outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E60 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Working Paper: Political Institutions, Voter Turnout and Policy Outcomes (2008) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:2:p:162-173

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.10.002

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