Nudges and norms: On the political economy of soft paternalism

Jan Schnellenbach

European Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 28, issue 2, 266-277

Abstract: This paper discusses soft (or libertarian) paternalism, as proposed among others by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It is argued that soft paternalism should not be understood as an efficiency-enhancing, but as a redistributive concept. The relationship between soft paternalism and social norms is discussed in detail. In particular, it is argued that soft paternalism increases the stability of given social norms, which in turn need not be efficient, nor in the material self-interest of a majority of individuals. Soft paternalism is argued to be an essentially conservative concept of policy-making in the sense that it tends to increase the longevity of status quo social norms.

Keywords: Libertarian paternalism; Soft paternalism; Social norms; Informal institutions; Behavioral political economics; Sour grapes; Expressive behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 D61 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:2:p:266-277

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.001

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