Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence

Emma Aisbett and Carol McAusland ()

European Journal of Political Economy, 2013, vol. 29, issue C, 214-235

Abstract: An adversarial game is used to model a firm's intrinsic and exerted influence over a regulator. Data from the World Business Environment Survey provide strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular relevance to public debate, the theory and econometric analysis show that large firms are more likely to be influential and to benefit from subsidies and low tax constraints. However, large firms are also likely to face greater regulatory constraint from environmental and safety rules.

Keywords: Political economy; Regulation; Subsidies; Influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H25 L51 P16 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Firm Characteristics and Influence on Government Rule-Making: theory and evidence (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:29:y:2013:i:c:p:214-235

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.09.005

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