The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection

Thomas Stratmann

European Journal of Political Economy, 2013, vol. 32, issue C, 341-355

Abstract: Many models predict that incumbent legislators use government spending – “pork barrel” spending – to increase their vote shares in elections. To date, however, evidence for this hypothesis is scarce. Using recently available data on the sponsorship of earmarks in U.S. appropriations legislation, this paper tests the effects of earmarks on the likelihood of legislators' reelection. The results show that secured earmarks lead to higher vote shares. The analysis demonstrates that a $10million increase in earmarks leads to as much as a one percentage point increase in vote share on election day. Furthermore, the paper tests for voter responses to earmarks when earmarks have few or many sponsors.

Keywords: Elections; Reelections; Pork-barrel politics; Distributional; Politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H3 H6 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:32:y:2013:i:c:p:341-355

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.08.001

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