Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries

Zohal Hessami

European Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 34, issue C, 372-389

Abstract: This paper examines the relation between political corruption and the composition of public spending. A rent-seeking model is used to describe political rent creation through the composition of public spending. Political corruption is indicated by empirical results for 29 OECD countries for the period 1996–2009: allocation of public spending to expenditure categories characterized by high-technology goods supplied by non-competitive industries varies positively with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International. Previous literature on corruption in government has focused on low-income countries. The results of this study suggest that political corruption is also an issue in OECD countries.

Keywords: Corruption; Rent seeking; Rent creation; Public procurement; Budget composition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S017626801400024X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:372-389

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.005

Access Statistics for this article

European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

More articles in European Journal of Political Economy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).