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The law of large districts: How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation

David Stadelmann, Marco Portmann and Reiner Eichenberger ()

European Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 35, issue C, 128-140

Abstract: It is well established that individual parliamentary representatives are less likely to decide according to the preferences of their constituency when the number of representatives per district, i.e. district magnitude, increases. However, we propose that for majority decisions of district representatives the opposite holds due to the existence of a law of large numbers in political representation. The academic literature has so far focused on the behavior of individual politicians but disregarded systematic aggregation effects. We provide a theoretical discussion and offer empirical evidence for the validity of a law of large numbers in political representation: As district magnitude increases, the quality of political representation by the majority of representatives increases, too.

Keywords: Law of large districts; Representation; Electoral accountability; Preferences; District magnitude (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D78 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:35:y:2014:i:c:p:128-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.05.002

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European Journal of Political Economy is currently edited by J. De Haan, A. L. Hillman and H. W. Ursprung

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