When choosing to be almost certain of winning can be better than choosing to win with certainty

Avichai Snir

European Journal of Political Economy, 2014, vol. 36, issue C, 135-146

Abstract: Participants in dictator games often contribute significant sums to unknown beneficiaries. This has been interpreted as suggesting that participants like to be perc.eived as generous even in anonymous situations.

Keywords: Allocations; Dictator; Experiments; Fairness; Lottery; Selfishness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D31 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:36:y:2014:i:c:p:135-146

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.006

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